Opinions and Analysis
iGDP publishes opinions and analysis on a variety of media platforms. We also issue a quarterly newsletter and iGDP Insights containing analysis of developments in climate policy.
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According to the International Energy Agency, the approximately 2 billion air conditioning units in operation around the world were responsible for 994 million tons of CO2 emissions in 2021.These emissions are growing every year, as the living standard of people in the world’s developing economies continues to improve. By 2050, there will be nearly 6 billion air conditioning units in use worldwide.
Air conditioning, also referred to as space cooling, leads to greenhouse gas emissions via energy consumption. Cooling indoor spaces accounts for almost 20 percent of the electricity used in buildings. In China’s large and medium-sized cities, air conditioning in summer accounts for about 60 percent of the peak electricity load, which is the period of time when demand for electricity is highest.
In 2019, China’s National Development and Reform Commission and other departments jointly issued the “National Clean Cooling Action Plan”. The plan is to improve overall energy efficiency levels of cooling products, such as household air conditioners, by more than 25 percent, and increase the market share of green and high-efficiency cooling products by more than 40 percent by 2030.
(Read the full op-ed here)
In previous years, agriculture and the food system might not have been a topic of much concern or debate, but the presence of not one, but three Food and Agriculture Pavilions at the 27th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 27) demonstrated that things have changed. The relevance of agriculture and the food system to the global fight against climate change is becoming one of the most widely recognized issues in international environmental diplomacy. This was also the case true at COP 15 in Montreal, Canada, with the Global Biodiversity Outlook published by the Secretariat of the Convention on Biodiversity arguing that agricultural systems are key to protecting biodiversity. The importance of the agri-food system as a driver of human impact on the environment is clearly in the spotlight and needs to be examined.
The race is on to show leadership in this important area of work, and China already has many of the foundations for success in place. A new study by innovative Green Development Program (iGDP), a Beijing-based non-profit consultancy, shows that with enhancements to existing policies, China could meaningfully reduce greenhouse gas emissions from its agri-food system. The key, as always, is digging into the system to figure out where the emissions are coming from, and what the right intervention points are.
(Read the full op-ed here)
With the global struggle against climate change taking on increased urgency, countries around the world are working to ensure that their energy transitions are fair to all members of society.
The concept of a just transition is one in which phasing out of one kind of industry is carried out in a way which protects the livelihood and economic vitality of affected regions, with particular emphasis on helping workers retain meaningful employment.
In recent years, the concept of a just transition has also expanded to include ideas about social justice (employment, income, social dignity), environmental and climate justice (a clean and safe living environment, land restoration), as well as energy justice (affordable and adequate energy) for everyone.
(Read the full op-ed here)
China released its 14th five-year plan (FYP) for renewable energy on 1 June, outlining the country’s renewable energy roadmap for the five years 2021-2025.
This is the first sub-sector plan issued since the 14FYP for a modern energy system, published earlier this year. Among all the documents that China has issued under the so-called “1+N” policy framework for enforcing its climate pledges, the energy plan and its sub-sector plan on renewable energy might be the most fundamental to China’s decarbonisation.
Therefore, to the extent that the new 14FYP for renewables can meet or overperform on its goals, it would also contribute to China’s effort to peak carbon emissions early and help bridge the global emission reduction gap towards a 1.5C pathway.
(Read the full op-ed here)
The world is running out of time. China and the US must cooperate if Paris climate deadline is to be met.
Relations between the United States and China have seen ups and downs since they were normalized. But the relationship is now close to its lowest possible point. How can the two countries cooperate on climate change when they seem to be so starkly at odds in other critical areas of engagement?
Other global challenges make the need for cooperation between the great powers even more urgent. The COVID-19 pandemic is not yet over. Skyrocketing energy prices have yet to be brought under control. The Ukraine crisis has exacerbated global food insecurity.
Climate cooperation could serve as a positive example of the magnanimity that is needed in these difficult times.
(Read the full op-ed here)
As the world’s second most abundant greenhouse gas, methane has received high media and political attention in recent years. The latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change pointed out the significant role reducing methane emissions can play in lowering peak warming and reducing the likelihood of overshooting warming limits. China, the largest methane emitter, has started ramping up its efforts to reduce methane emissions, but there is more that could be done. With bold thinking and higher ambition China can improve its reductions in the energy, waste and agriculture sectors.
(Read the full op-ed here)
As world leaders prepare to gather for the November UN climate change summit in Glasgow, all eyes are on China. As the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the emission reduction commitments China makes in its second Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)—a country’s stated climate goals under the Paris Agreement—will provide direction for domestic climate actions and inform international climate cooperation efforts. In a recent Green Development Program report, we examine how China performed under its 2015 NDC and reflect on the targets and supporting policies we might expect to see in its second NDC. The good news? We see huge potential for China to go bigger and bolder in its climate action.
(Read the full op-ed here)
Non-CO2 GHGs have not yet received sufficient policy attention in China’s overall carbon mitigation effort. Now that China has announced that it will achieve carbon neutrality before 2060, the race is on to deliver on this ambitious vision. Every carbon-reducing measure will have to be considered.
To systematically reduce non-CO2 GHG emissions, China needs a comprehensive policy framework that explicitly targets non-CO2 GHGs one by one, sector by sector. This would be an important boost to China’s climate action, helping to both fulfill its commitments under the Kigali Amendment and achieve 2060 carbon neutrality.
(Read the full op-ed here)
An important component of keeping global warming within the limits set by the Paris Agreement is the need to reduce hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are powerful greenhouse gases (GHGs) that are increasingly used in the cooling sector.
The 2016 Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol calls for an 85 percent reduction in HFC production and use by 2047 to avoid an up to 0.4 C rise in global temperatures by the end of the century. But the world’s two biggest GHG emitters－China and the United States－have yet to ratify the amendment. However, that might soon be changing.
(Read the full op-ed here)
One might wonder about the real motivation behind President Xi Jinping’s exciting, and to some, surprising pledge before the United Nations General Assembly on Sept 22 to reach carbon neutrality by 2060. It’s likely that there is some degree of geopolitical calculation behind the pledge, but the main driver is the leadership’s vision of creating a “beautiful China” by promoting “ecological civilization” and a high-quality economy driven by technological innovation. Given this high-level and long-term political goal of China, we can expect to see the development of a slew of short-term follow-up policies.
(Read the full op-ed here)
The last three years have seen China’s policymakers pay more attention to the country’s worsening waste problem. In 2018, China’s municipal solid waste (MSW) reached 22.8 million tonnes, a quantity that is expected to climb up to 409 million tonnes by 2030 as China continues to urbanize and grow economically. This swelling volume of garbage poses a threat to both the environment and the climate.
In 2017, China launched a pilot program of new waste sorting regulations in selected cities, and policymakers are now planning a national scale-up. In late April this year, the Chinese government approved changes to the Solid Waste Law, making waste sorting a core element of the revised law.
(Read the full op-ed in English here)
Chinese cities are trying to raise their carbon-reduction targets and integrate them with their long-term development plans
The goal of the Paris Agreement is to control the global average temperature increase to less than 2 C above the pre-industrial level, and if possible to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 C. Limiting temperature rise to 2 C means that emissions in 2050 will have to be reduced by 40 to 70 percent compared to 2010, while the more ambitious 1.5 C target means that there will have to be “zero emissions” by 2050.
To push this forward, the parties to the Paris Agreement are invited to inform the Convention Secretariat this year of their long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies.
But country-level long-term strategies are not the only game in town.
(Read the full op-ed in English here)
Chinese cities are trying to raise their carbon-reduction targets and integrate them with their long-term development plans
The goal of the Paris Agreement is to control the global average temperature increase to less than 2 C above the pre-industrial level, and if possible to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 C. Limiting temperature rise to 2 C means that emissions in 2050 will have to be reduced by 40 to 70 percent compared to 2010, while the more ambitious 1.5 C target means that there will have to be “zero emissions” by 2050.
To push this forward, the parties to the Paris Agreement are invited to inform the Convention Secretariat this year of their long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies.
But country-level long-term strategies are not the only game in town.
(Read the full op-ed in English here)
iGDP Insights - Leveraging Air Pollution to Reduce Carbon in China
February 2020
The last few years have seen a number of disappointing developments in climate policy. In the US, which until recently was the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, the Trump administration has turned its back on the Paris Agreement. China, which hopes to assume a leadership role in global mitigation efforts, is still building coal-fired power plants. And despite the fact that global emissions continue to increase, COP 22 failed to produce the strong commitments to action that the climate community has been calling for.
If the dire warnings of climate scientists can’t motivate serious action, what can? In China, going forward one of those things will likely be air quality. This is a policy area that has seen swift and decisive action in recent years, and that policymakers are increasingly seeing as a venue to achieve near-term gains in environmental quality and drive long-term changes in China’s economic structure.
Air pollution in China reached a nadir in the “Airpocalypse” of January 2013, when PM2.5 in and around Beijing reached record levels for a sustained period. This resulted in a widespread public outcry for clean air, and in March 2014, at the opening of the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, Premier Li Keqiang declared a “war on pollution”.
iGDP Insights - What to Expect in China's Second Nationally Determined Contribution
September 2019
After the hottest summer on human record, the 2019 Climate Action Summit will be held in New York on September 23. With Brazil struggling with the most intense rainforest fires in almost a decade and Greenland having recently experienced one of the most massive melting episodes in the last 700 years, urgency and action are the key words leading up to the summit.
Hosted by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, the summit aims to boost the ambition of the signatories to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. According to the Paris Agreement’s implementation rules, countries are to submit their second round of NDCs in 2020. These new NDCs should show a strengthening of each country’s climate actions.
China is the world’s largest GHG emitter, but the general trend line of its climate actions gives us reason for hope. Of course, one is bound to be disappointed if the expectation is that China will stop burning coal tomorrow. But there are reasons to be bullish about China in the long run. Just this June, at the G20 summit in Japan, China, France and the UN reaffirmed their commitment to raise ambition in the new round of NDCs and to publish mid- and long-term low carbon development strategies by 2020.
So what can we expect from China’s second NDC? A new iGDP analytical report describes some of the possibilities (a summary of the report can be found here).
Op-ed: Time to Step Up to the Climate Plate
July 15, 2019
China clearly enhancing its Nationally Determined Contributions ahead of COP 26 would provide much-needed leadership and a shot of political energy and ambition.
The European Union’s recent failure to agree on strengthening its long-term climate change mitigation target and the division on climate change actions evident at the recent G20 Summit in Osaka have again highlighted the leadership gap and need for greater international cooperation in global environmental governance.
Observers have increasingly been looking to China to step up and fill this void. This came through loud and clear at the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) annual general meeting held in Hangzhou in early June, along with the belief that this could revive and galvanize international environmental cooperation.
Op-ed: Leveraging China's "Green Soft Power" For Responsible Belt and Road Initiative Investment
May 14, 2019
China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI) presents a challenge to global efforts to tackle climate change and move toward a carbon neutral pathway. With $900 billion in potential foreign infrastructure spending under the BRI framework indicated by President Xi, China’s BRI could help – or hurt – clean energy development in emerging economics.
China has trumpeted its commitment to build a green BRI, most recently at the BRI Summit in Beijing, and as far back as 2015 when the central government stated “efforts should be made to promote green and low-carbon infrastructure construction and operation management, taking into full account the impact of climate change.” Since then, China has issued related policies including the “Guiding Opinions on Promoting a Green BRI.”
Op-ed: China’s National Carbon Market: Mapping Out the Road Ahead
January 4, 2019
China’s emission trading system (ETS), which has been operating as regional pilot programs since 2013, was expanded nationwide in December 2017. At this juncture, the national carbon market covers only the power generation sector — covering 1,700 emitters and a third of China’s total emissions. The sector was chosen because it is responsible for so much of China’s carbon emissions, and because it has a relatively solid system of emission data collection. Taking a close look at the national ETS after one year is worthwhile because it is a key component of China’s effort to pursue economic development in a way that delivers growth, protects the natural environment and reduces carbon emissions.
Op-ed: Money Grows on Trees: Financing China's Green Future
December 18, 2018
With the 24th Conference of Parties coming to a close, the world has been looking toward Poland for new signs of hope in the climate change challenge. Saturday’s encouraging 200-country deal notwithstanding, recent reports show that not enough is being done to limit the global temperature increase to 2 degrees centigrade, which experts consider necessary to prevent the worst effects of dangerous climate change. In addition, the Trump administration in the United States has rejected climate science and wants to blow off the Paris Agreement, threatening to undermine the international cooperation that is critical to addressing one of the 21st century’s most urgent and complex global problems.
Other countries (and US sub-national actors), however, have not given up. Policymakers, researchers, and advocacy organizations around the world are pressing forward in the design and implementation of new climate solutions. One of the most promising areas of work is green finance – the effort to ensure that public and private investments in financial assets are both profitable and environment-friendly.
Op-ed: Regulatory Shakeup Gives Boost to Climate Change Reform
August 17, 2018
China is undergoing an enormous government restructuring, strengthening policy integration among government agencies. A major reform that has been little-noticed outside the climate policy community is the move of the Department of Climate Change from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the influential economic planning agency, to China’s new Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE).
Released on Monday, the organizational reform plan, or “San Ding Fang’an,” lays out the MEE’s mandate, organizational structure and staffing details. The MEE’s mandate on climate policy has three parts — to develop macro-level climate strategy, plans and policy; to jointly lead climate international climate change negotiations together with other relevant ministries; and to implement and coordinate affairs related to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
What is the implication of these changes in China’s future climate policy? Shall we expect more-ambitious goals, or the contrary? What specific policies and actions can we expect from the new MEE?